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Web Server : Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.5.9-1ubuntu4.29 OpenSSL/1.0.1f
System : Linux b8009 3.13.0-170-generic #220-Ubuntu SMP Thu May 9 12:40:49 UTC 2019 x86_64
User : www-data ( 33)
PHP Version : 5.5.9-1ubuntu4.29
Disable Function : pcntl_alarm,pcntl_fork,pcntl_waitpid,pcntl_wait,pcntl_wifexited,pcntl_wifstopped,pcntl_wifsignaled,pcntl_wexitstatus,pcntl_wtermsig,pcntl_wstopsig,pcntl_signal,pcntl_signal_dispatch,pcntl_get_last_error,pcntl_strerror,pcntl_sigprocmask,pcntl_sigwaitinfo,pcntl_sigtimedwait,pcntl_exec,pcntl_getpriority,pcntl_setpriority,
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Directory :  /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/

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Current File : /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/base
# vim:syntax=apparmor
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
#
#    Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Novell/SUSE
#    Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Canonical Ltd.
#
#    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
#    modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
#    License published by the Free Software Foundation.
#
# ------------------------------------------------------------------



  # (Note that the ldd profile has inlined this file; if you make
  # modifications here, please consider including them in the ldd
  # profile as well.)

  # The __canary_death_handler function writes a time-stamped log
  # message to /dev/log for logging by syslogd. So, /dev/log, timezones,
  # and localisations of date should be available EVERYWHERE, so
  # StackGuard, FormatGuard, etc., alerts can be properly logged.
  /dev/log                       w,
  /dev/random                    r,
  /dev/urandom                   r,
  /etc/locale/**                 r,
  /etc/locale.alias              r,
  /etc/localtime                 r,
  /etc/writable/localtime        r,
  /usr/share/locale-langpack/**  r,
  /usr/share/locale/**           r,
  /usr/share/**/locale/**        r,
  /usr/share/zoneinfo/           r,
  /usr/share/zoneinfo/**         r,
  /usr/share/X11/locale/**       r,

  /usr/lib{,32,64}/locale/**             mr,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/gconv/*.so            mr,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/gconv/gconv-modules*  mr,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gconv/*.so           mr,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gconv/gconv-modules* mr,

  # used by glibc when binding to ephemeral ports
  /etc/bindresvport.blacklist    r,

  # ld.so.cache and ld are used to load shared libraries; they are best
  # available everywhere
  /etc/ld.so.cache               mr,
  /lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so   mrix,
  /lib{,32,64}/**/ld{,32,64}-*.so     mrix,
  /lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so    mrix,
  /lib/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/ld-*.so     mrix,
  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/ld-*.so     mrix,
  /opt/*-linux-uclibc/lib/ld-uClibc*so* mrix,

  # we might as well allow everything to use common libraries
  /lib{,32,64}/**                r,
  /lib{,32,64}/lib*.so*          mr,
  /lib{,32,64}/**/lib*.so*       mr,
  /lib/@{multiarch}/**            r,
  /lib/@{multiarch}/lib*.so*      mr,
  /lib/@{multiarch}/**/lib*.so*   mr,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/**            r,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/*.so*         mr,
  /usr/lib{,32,64}/**/lib*.so*   mr,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/**          r,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/lib*.so*    mr,
  /usr/lib/@{multiarch}/**/lib*.so* mr,
  /lib/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/lib*.so*    mr,
  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/lib*.so*    mr,

  # /dev/null is pretty harmless and frequently used
  /dev/null                      rw,
  # as is /dev/zero
  /dev/zero                      rw,
  # recent glibc uses /dev/full in preference to /dev/null for programs
  # that don't have open fds at exec()
  /dev/full                      rw,

  # Sometimes used to determine kernel/user interfaces to use
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/version     r,
  # Depending on which glibc routine uses this file, base may not be the
  # best place -- but many profiles require it, and it is quite harmless.
  @{PROC}/sys/kernel/ngroups_max r,

  # glibc's sysconf(3) routine to determine free memory, etc
  @{PROC}/meminfo                r,
  @{PROC}/stat                   r,
  @{PROC}/cpuinfo                r,
  /sys/devices/system/cpu/online r,

  # glibc's *printf protections read the maps file
  @{PROC}/@{pid}/maps            r,

  # libgcrypt reads some flags from /proc
  @{PROC}/sys/crypto/*           r,

  # some applications will display license information
  /usr/share/common-licenses/**  r,

  # glibc statvfs
  @{PROC}/filesystems            r,

  # glibc malloc (man 5 proc)
  @{PROC}/sys/vm/overcommit_memory r,

  # Allow other processes to read our /proc entries, futexes, perf tracing and
  # kcmp for now
  ptrace (readby),

  # Allow other processes to trace us by default (they will need 'trace' in
  # the first place). Administrators can override with:
  #   deny ptrace (tracedby) ...
  ptrace (tracedby),

  # Allow unconfined processes to send us signals by default
  signal (receive) peer=unconfined,

  # Allow us to signal ourselves
  signal peer=@{profile_name},

  # Checking for PID existence is quite common so add it by default for now
  signal (receive, send) set=("exists"),

  # Workaround https://launchpad.net/bugs/359338 until upstream handles stacked
  # filesystems generally. This does not appreciably decrease security with
  # Ubuntu profiles because the user is expected to have access to files owned
  # by him/her. Exceptions to this are explicit in the profiles. While this rule
  # grants access to those exceptions, the intended privacy is maintained due to
  # the encrypted contents of the files in this directory. Files in this
  # directory will also use filename encryption by default, so the files are
  # further protected. Also, with the use of 'owner', this rule properly
  # prevents access to the files from processes running under a different uid.

  # encrypted ~/.Private and old-style encrypted $HOME
  owner @{HOME}/.Private/** mrixwlk,
  # new-style encrypted $HOME
  owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/** mrixwlk,


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